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organizations, Dr. Andrea Menclova and Mr. Paul Walker at the University of Canterbury, and Mr. 
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I am happy to appear before the committee to speak to my submission should the committee wish me 
to do so; I do not request an appearance before the committee otherwise. 
I can be contacted at 03 364 2824 and eric.crampton@canterbury.ac.nz  
  
Submission 
1. I oppose the intent of this bill because it seeks to alleviate a problem that has largely been 
overstated. While alcohol abuse does cause many problems, measures of the costs of these 
problems are deeply flawed and severely overstated. Further, unless policy is highly targeted 
against the drinkers that do impose serious and real harm on others, the Government risks 
penalizing moderate drinkers whose consumption not only provides them real enjoyment but 
also is associated with moderate health benefits. 
There is no pressing problem to be addressed 
2. The explanatory note accompanying the legislation suggests alcohol abuse is implicated in a high 
proportion of criminal offenses and imposes large costs on the taxpayer. 
 
3. The New Zealand Police do not record whether alcohol caused any particular crime. The Law 
Commission’s report, Alcohol in our lives, presented no evidence that would allow us to 
determine the proportion of alcohol-related offenses that were in fact caused by alcohol. It will 
certainly be true that many offenders appearing before the Court  will present with alcohol 
abuse and addiction issues. The Law Commission reports for example that about a third of 
offenders in assaults had consumed alcohol. But what proportion of those offenses would have 
disappeared absent alcohol? Measures of the costs of alcohol relied on by the Commission 
assume that a large proportion of such offenses would not occur absent alcohol – that alcohol is 
causally important. But they present no evidence allowing such conclusions. Similarly, should we 
conclude that alcohol causes a lot of domestic abuse, or that those who like to abuse their 
spouse and children also like to drink? We simply cannot draw the kinds of causal conclusions 
asserted in the Bill’s explanatory note without serious and difficult research that has not been 
undertaken. It is certainly likely that alcohol contributes to some offenders’ offending in a causal 
way. But the figures reported by the New Zealand Police and the Law Commission represent 
only correlations, not causal relationships, and consequently overstate the harms that could be 
avoided in the absence of alcohol. Without understanding the direction of causation, the risk 
this legislation runs is that it produces cost but no benefits, and may even increase costs 
through unintended effects, which I discuss below. 
 
4. The explanatory note cites costs to the government of $1.2 billion per annum. The figure most 
likely derives from BERL’s 2009 estimate of the social costs of harmful alcohol use: at page 76, 
they cited tangible costs to the government of $972 million from alcohol use and $284 million 
from joint abuse of alcohol and other drugs. BERL’s figures here are enormously overstated. 
Matthew Burgess and I examined the BERL study in rather great detail, issuing a working paper 
critiquing their findings. The Committee might wish to note the following: 
a. BERL cites a cost to the government of $464.9 million in labour costs – taxes on labour 
income. BERL’s estimate of the cost of lost labour requires that any worker who dies 
early can never be replaced by an unemployed worker: that the output that would have 
been produced by a deceased worker could never otherwise have been produced. The 
method they used in deriving this figure is unsound. We found that only $558.7 million 
could properly be described as earnings forgone by workers due to excess alcohol use. 
Even if none of those workers were replaced and they each paid an average tax rate of 
33% (rather than a marginal tax rate of 33%), that still would provide a figure less than 
half of BERL’s estimate.  
 
b. They cite crime costs of $367.8 million. How did they derive this figure? From a survey 
asking prisoners whether alcohol had contributed “Entirely”, “A lot”, “Somewhat”, “A 
little”, or “Not at all” to their offending. If the prisoner said “somewhat”, BERL assumed 
that the crime was entirely due to alcohol. This is wholly implausible. 
 
c. Their measured health care costs include the cost of harmful alcohol use but explicitly 
sets to zero any potential health benefits from drinking.1
 
 This matters because even 
heavy harmful drinkers can have reduced risk of coronary heart disease. Heavy drinkers 
impose net costs on the health system. But BERL overstates those costs by leaving aside 
those measures on which drinkers have lower costs. By way of illustration, assume that 
a heavy drinker costs the health system an extra $500 per year in liver-related disorders 
but saves the health system $100 per year in reduced coronary disorders. The proper 
measure of net costs would be $400, but BERL reports $500. Further, by focusing on 
heavy drinkers, they ignore the savings that moderate drinkers provide to the health 
system. 
d. Our correction of BERL’s total estimates found that rather than imposing a $4.8 billion 
annual cost on society, drinkers imposed an external cost slightly below the amount of 
excise tax they paid the government. In other words, drinkers pay their way. A study by 
Treasury in 2002 came to a similar conclusion to ours.2
 
 
e. The Law Commission employed Australian consultants Marsden Jacob and Associates to 
evaluate our work. Their report severely mischaracterized our method. Where they 
asserted our figures relied on overestimates of the health benefits of moderate drinking, 
we had actually made no accounting for health benefits of moderate drinking; rather, 
we noted that such correction would further reduce our estimate. They further asserted 
that we used a method – ignoring “fiscal externalities” – of which Treasury would 
disapprove. In actuality, our report fully included those figures but noted in a one-
paragraph robustness check at the end of the document what the numbers would have 
                                                          
1 The health benefits of moderate alcohol consumption are now well established in the empirical literature. The 
most comprehensive survey is by Castelnuovo and Donati (2006) “Alcohol Dosing and Total Mortality in Men and 
Women,” available from http://archinte.highwire.org/cgi/content/abstract/166/22/2437 
2 Barker, Felicity, (2002), “Consumption Externalities and the Role of Government: The Case of Alcohol,” New 
Zealand Treasury Working Paper 02/25. 
looked like had we used that alternative, potentially less preferred, approach.3
 
 I have 
attached my submission to the Law Commission, little of which was adequately 
addressed in the Law Commission’s report. 
5. The legislation is predicated on that there is a serious problem with youth drinking caused by 
the lowering of the drinking age. The 2010 Social Report for New Zealand4 noted that 
“potentially hazardous drinking” among 15-24 year olds in 1996/1997 was 40.8%. In 1999, the 
minimum age for alcohol purchase dropped from 20 to 18. The rate of “potentially hazardous 
drinking” in 2002/2003 was 38.7% and in 2006/2007 was 41.1%. The increase in the rate of 
potentially hazardous youth drinking consequent to the change in the drinking age is smaller 
than year-on-year changes. Similarly, the Ministry of Justice found only a trivial increase in the 
proportion of disorderly behaviour offences being committed by 18 and 19 year olds with the 
reduction in the alcohol purchase age.5
Some proposed remedies may do harm 
 Why does the Government believe that returning to a 
drinking age of 20 will reduce problems associated with potentially hazardous youth drinking 
when youth drinking did not change? The Law Commission report makes much of the horrors of 
youth drinking but does remarkably little to show that the reduction in the alcohol purchase age 
was to blame. We might then wonder why an increase in the purchase age will bring substantial 
benefits. 
6. Restrictions on permitted trading hours can cause problems where patrons of several bars all 
disgorge onto the streets at once, increasing the potential for adverse neighborhood effects.6
 
 
7. Provisions making it more difficult to open on or off license facilities may confer local monopoly 
rents to those with existing licenses. 
 
8. Provisions allowing greater local body discretion in placing restrictions on license issuance invite 
lobbying of local bodies by those with licenses against the issuance of new licenses. 
 
                                                          
3 More detailed critique is available at http://offsettingbehaviour.blogspot.com/2010/04/marsden-jacob-on-
alcohol.html and http://offsettingbehaviour.blogspot.com/2010/04/marsden-jacob-review-continued.html .  
4 http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/health/potentially-hazardous-drinking.html 
5 “Young people and alcohol: Some statistics to 2003 and 2004 on possible effects of lowering the purchase age”. 
Available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/y/young-people-and-alcohol-some-
statistics-to-2003-and-2004-on-possible-effects-of-lowering-the-purchase-age/4-indicators-of-alcohol-related-
offending-by-those-under-20-years-old-and-all-ages-disorderly-behaviour  . They note an increase in the number 
of youths arrested, but this can hardly be attributed to the change in the drinking age if the proportion remained 
constant: total numbers of arrests at all ages increased. Eighteen and nineteen year olds accounted for 18.6% of 
disorderly behaviour convictions in 1998 and for 18.7% of convictions in 2004.   
6 Briscoe, Suzanne and Neil Donnelly. 2001. “Temporal and regional aspects of alcohol-related violence and 
disorder”. Alcohol Studies Bulletin No. 1. Available at 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/assaultsinbars/PDFs/Briscoe&Donnelly_2001a.pdf . See also Dehan, Ann. 
1999. “Alcohol and Crime: Taking Stock.” Home Office. Available at 
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/assaultsinbars/PDFs/Deehan_1999.pdf 
9. Restriction on sale promotions by off-licensees, presumably directed at supermarket sales, 
hinders price competition among supermarket retailers. It is odd that such provisions are 
directed at off-licensees: individuals buying on special at an off-license are far more able to store 
the purchased alcohol and consume it over time than are consumers at an on-license premise. 
 
10. The proposed remedies do not seem well targeted at heavy problem drinkers. A small minority 
of problem drinkers imposes serious costs on the rest of the country through crime and drink 
driving. Reducing the number of liquor outlets and restricting trading hours seems unlikely to 
affect this group. Heavy drinkers are the least responsive to measures that increase the cost of 
their drinking: the best evidence suggests that a given price increase will decrease a heavy 
drinker’s drinking by only about sixty percent of the amount by which it decreases a moderate 
drinker’s drinking.7
Some alternative solutions have been ignored 
 The legislation does not propose increased taxes, but increases in the cost of 
acquiring alcohol would have a similar effect unless there are other significant differences 
between problem and moderate drinkers. If it is the case that heavy drinkers are substantially 
poorer and have less access to transport, making it harder in general to purchase liquor may 
differentially affect that cohort of drinkers. But this targeting is weak and indirect at best. 
11. If Parliament is seriously concerned about harms associated with under-aged drinking, raising 
the purchase age and imposing penalties on those supplying liquor to minors seems far less 
likely to be effective than imposing a penalty by way of infringement on minors found to be in 
possession of alcohol. The Law Commission worries that penalties on minors may make minors 
reluctant to call emergency services in case of need; however, if the penalty is for being in 
possession of alcohol rather than simply having consumed it, youths can fairly easily dispose of 
the alcohol in their possession should a call to emergency services be required. The primary 
effect of punishing minors found in possession of alcohol would be to reduce the external costs 
imposed by drunken youths: if a police bust of a noisy party would draw a lot of fines for those 
there found in possession, youths might well be more discreet about their drinking. Police would 
also have discretion to ask youths to pour out their liquor if found in possession lest they draw 
infringement notices, or to impose fines if the youths were actually being a nuisance. This again 
encourages youths to be more discreet and to impose fewer costs on others. Canada has a very 
similar regime for minors found in possession of alcohol. 
 
12. Similarly, if Parliament is concerned with the costs of disorderly behaviour by those intoxicated, 
why not encourage greater enforcement of current legislation? Disorderly Behaviour is an 
offence under section 3 of the Summary Offences Act 1981.  Rather than setting blanket 
regulations that affect all drinkers – like national closing times and greater regulation of 
                                                          
7 Wagenaar, Alexander et al. 2008. “Effects of beverage alcohol price and tax levels on drinking: a meta-analysis of 
1003 estimates from 112 studies.” Addiction 104: 179-190. Available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2008.02438.x/pdf 
licensees – why not target enforcement against those who are demonstrably imposing costs on 
others? 
